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NEWSGROUPS FLOAT INTO SAFE HARBOR, 
AND COPYRIGHT HOLDERS ARE SUNK 
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ABSTRACT 
Usenet newsgroups are swiftly becoming a popular 
vehicle for pirating digital music, movies, books, and other 
copyrighted works. Meanwhile, courts ignore Usenet’s 
tremendous potential for copyright infringement.  In Ellison 
v. Robertson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
America Online’s Usenet service might qualify for safe 
harbor under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  
According to the district court below, safe harbor would 
preclude a finding of secondary copyright infringement 
against America Online.  However, the courts misinterpreted 
the safe harbor provisions.  One safe harbor provision was 
misapplied and another was ignored altogether.  This iBrief 
critiques the Ellison opinions and analyzes the application of 
the safe harbor provisions to Usenet operators. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 After major entertainment companies declared war against 
popular file-sharing networks, digital pirates were forced to explore 
other options.2  Usenet is one of these other options.3  Conceived by 
two Duke University graduate students in 1979,4 Usenet is a 
distributed discussion network now containing over 100,000 
newsgroups.5  Each newsgroup is a topical discussion board on which 
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4 Usenet, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Usenet&oldid=75866987
 (last visited Sept. 15, 2006). 
5 Newsgroup, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Newsgroup&oldid=75742602
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users can post messages.6  When a user posts a message to the news 
server operated by that user’s internet service provider (“ISP”), the 
message is copied to other ISPs’ servers as part of an automatic 
process called “peering.”7  Because many servers are passing 
messages between one another, each message eventually exists on all 
connected servers.8 
¶2 Usenet newsgroups are swiftly gaining popularity.  The 
volume of data stored on newsgroups doubles every eight to twelve 
months.9  Among files existing in newsgroup posts are purportedly 
illegal copies of episodes of the television shows Lost and Desperate 
Housewives, and copies of the movies Star Wars Episode III, 
Chronicles of Narnia, and King Kong.10 
¶3 In Usenet’s early years, only text files could be distributed 
over newsgroups.11  This was initially a major drawback for those 
wishing to share digital media.  However, the text-only restriction led 
to innovation.  There are now tools available to encode digital media 
into text files before posting them.12  First, a user encodes a binary 
media file into text and posts the file on a news server.  When another 
user downloads a file, she simply decodes the text to retrieve the 
original media. 
¶4 In Ellison v. Robertson,13 the Ninth Circuit found that 
America Online (“AOL”) might be shielded from liability for 
secondary copyright infringement for its operation of Usenet 
newsgroups.14  This was not the first time a court refused to find 
                                                                                                             
 (last visited Sept. 15, 2006). 
6 Usenet, supra note 4. 
7 Id.; see generally Peering, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Peering&oldid=74000083 (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2006) (defining “peering” in general and in various specific contexts). 
8 Usenet, supra note 4. 
9 Tom Mainelli, Newsgroups Get a New Life, PCWORLD.COM, June 19, 2002, 
http://www.pcworld.com/resource/printable/article/0,aid,102081,00.asp. 
10 Press Release, Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Studios Move to Thwart Illegal 
File Swapping on Major Pirate Networks 2 (Feb. 23, 2006), 
http://www.mpaa.org/press_releases/2006_02_23.pdf. 
11 Usenet, supra note 4. 
12 Id. 
13 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004). 
14 Id. at 1081-82 (holding that, while there were triable issues of fact as to 
whether AOL was contributorily liable for copyright infringement, AOL was not 
directly or vicariously liable). 
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infringement despite the tremendous capacity for copyright 
infringement in newsgroups.15 
¶5 Ellison sued AOL, alleging contributory and vicarious 
copyright infringement for AOL’s role in operating Usenet on its 
servers.16  Although AOL did not operate the server onto which the 
infringing posts were originally uploaded, it automatically received 
the posts from other servers through peering.17  As per its policy to 
retain posts for fourteen days, AOL stored the infringing material on 
its servers.18  To avoid infringement liability, AOL sought safe 
harbor under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).19  
The DMCA offers four safe harbors for ISPs whose role in copyright 
infringement is passive or automatic, and meets certain other 
parameters.20  When a certain ISP activity falls under a safe harbor, 
the ISP may be held liable only for limited equitable relief and cannot 
be held liable for monetary relief.21  AOL invoked two of these safe 
harbors, the “Transitory Communications Safe Harbor”22 and the 
“Network Storage Safe Harbor,”23 but did not assert the remaining 
two safe harbors.24 
                                                          
15 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 
F. Supp. 1361, 1381 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that the Usenet operator in 
question was not liable for direct or vicarious copyright infringement for its 
automatic copying of infringing material posted by Usenet users, and the Usenet 
operator could only my contributorily liable if it ignored complaint letters from 
the copyright-holder). 
16 Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1074. 
17 Id. at 1075. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 1074. 
20 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 656-57 (N.D. Ill. 2002), 
aff’d, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
21 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d), (j) (2000). 
22 Id. § 512(a).  The given title, “Transitory Communications Safe Harbor,” is 
not an official title of the safe harbor but is merely used by the author for 
convenience throughout this iBrief. 
23 Id. § 512(c).  The given title, “Network Storage Safe Harbor,” is not an 
official title of the safe harbor but is merely used by the author for convenience 
throughout this iBrief. 
24 Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 357 F.3d at 1074 (9th Cir. 2004).  The two 
assumedly inapplicable safe harbors are the “System Caching Safe Harbor,” 17 
U.S.C. § 512(b), and the “Information Location Tools Safe Harbor,” id. 
§ 512(d).  As with the first two mentioned safe harbor provisions, the given titles 
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¶6 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
AOL, allowing AOL a complete shield from liability under the 
Transitory Communications Safe Harbor.25  On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit remanded for fact-finding on whether AOL met the threshold 
eligibility requirements for safe harbor protection.26  However, the 
Ninth Circuit did not upset the district court’s assumption that a 
single safe harbor precluded all monetary liability.27  As will be 
demonstrated in this iBrief, both the district court and the Ninth 
Circuit misinterpreted the application of the safe harbors. 
¶7 The remainder of this iBrief is divided into three sections:  
The first section examines the position of Usenet-operating ISPs 
under the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor.  The second 
section examines the courts’ failure to consider other safe harbors, 
particularly the Network Storage Safe Harbor.  The final section 
examines differences between the effects of the Transitory 
Communications and the Network Storage safe harbors.  Throughout 
these sections, this iBrief will critique the Ellison holdings of both the 
district court and the Ninth Circuit. 
I. TRANSITORY COMMUNICATIONS SAFE HARBOR 
¶8 In Ellison, both the Ninth Circuit and the district court 
determined that AOL satisfied the requirements for a limitation of 
liability under the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor.28  These 
decisions incorrectly applied the Transitory Communications Safe 
Harbor.  No party can take advantage of the Transitory 
                                                                                                             
of these two are used by the author for convenience and are not official titles of 
the safe harbors. 
25 Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1072 (granting summary judgment to AOL without 
considering the application of any other safe harbor). 
26 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004).  Before there can 
be a limitation on liability under a safe harbor, an alleged copyright infringer 
must meet threshold eligibility requirements.  17 U.S.C. § 512(i).  Under 
§ 512(i), a qualifying services provider must adopt, reasonably implement, and 
inform subscribers about a policy for terminating the subscription of repeat 
infringers.  § 512(i)(1).  Further, a qualifying service provider must 
accommodate and may not interfere with certain standard technical measures 
used to prevent copyright infringement.  § 512(i).  Whether these threshold 
conditions are met is beyond the scope of this iBrief. 
27 See Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1081 n.12 (declining to consider the application of the 
Network Storage Safe Harbor on the grounds that other matters had yet to be 
decided). 
28 See id. at 1082; see also Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1072. 
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Communications Safe Harbor unless it meets the applicable definition 
of “service provider.”29  Under the Transitory Communications Safe 
Harbor, a service provider is protected from monetary liability for 
copyright infringement 
by reason of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing 
connections for, material through a system or network controlled or 
operated by or for the service provider, or by reason of the 
intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such 
transmitting, routing, or providing connections, [only] if . . . the 
transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried 
out through an automatic technical process without selection of the 
material by the service provider; . . . [and] no copy of the material 
made by the service provider in the course of such intermediate or 
transient storage is maintained on the system or network in a manner 
ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients, and 
no such copy is maintained on the system or network in a manner 
ordinarily accessible to such anticipated recipients for a longer period 
than is reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision 
of connections . . . .30
¶9 The district court and the Ninth Circuit made at least five 
mistakes in their analyses of AOL’s position under this safe harbor.  
First, the courts assumed that AOL fit the definition of service 
provider.  Second, they found that AOL did not select the transmitted 
material.31  Third, they determined that AOL’s retention of posts for 
fourteen days was intermediate and transient.32  Fourth, they decided 
that the fourteen-day holding period was reasonably necessary for 
transmission, routing, or provision of connections.33  Fifth, the courts 
failed to consider the effect of the term “anticipated recipients” in the 
statute.  In this iBrief, the fourth and fifth of these mistakes will be 
considered together because the issues involved are intertwined. 
A. Definition of Service Provider 
¶10 For the purposes of this safe harbor, a “service provider” is a 
party that offers “transmission, routing, or provision of connections 
for digital online communications, between or among points specified 
                                                          
29 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 63 (1998). 
30 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (a)(2), (a)(4). 
31 Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. 
32 Id. at 1081. 
33 Id. 
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by a user, of material of the user's choosing.”34  When considering 
the totality of its offered services, AOL may qualify as a service 
provider for purposes of the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor.  
However, the fact that a provider offers some services that meet this 
definition does not imply that the provider qualifies for the safe 
harbor with respect to its other activities.35  In its capacity as a Usenet 
operator, AOL fails to qualify as a service provider under the 
Transitory Communications Safe Harbor.36 
¶11 AOL’s allegedly infringing conduct is its transmission and 
temporary storage of Usenet posts.  To qualify as a service provider, 
such transmission must occur only between points specified by a 
user.  However, after Usenet users upload posts, they have no control 
over where such posts are sent.  The path of transmission is always 
essentially the same.  After receiving a post, AOL stores the post’s 
contents on its servers and transfers the post to other ISPs by way of 
peering.  These actions occur regardless of the desires or directions of 
posting users.  Even if users have knowledge of the locations to 
which their posts will be transmitted, they have no control over the 
selection of these locations.  Such locations are not specified by a 
user but are predetermined by the peering process.  As such, in its 
capacity as Usenet operator, AOL is not a service provider for the 
purposes of the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor. 
B. Selection of Material 
¶12 An ISP is disqualified from this safe harbor if the transmitted 
material is selected by the ISP, rather than selected by an automatic 
process or by the ISP’s users.37  While AOL does not select 
individual postings, it does select which newsgroups to host on its 
servers.38  The district court in Ellison found that “selection” referred 
                                                          
34 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
35 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 64 (1998) (“[T]he fact that a provider 
performs some functions that fall within the definition of new subparagraph (A) 
does not imply that its other functions that do not fall within the definition of 
new subparagraph (A) qualify for the limitation of liability under new 
subsection (a).”). 
36 However, a broader definition of “service provider” applies to the other three 
safe harbors.  17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).  Therefore, parties that fail to qualify as 
“service provider” under the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor may still 
qualify as “service provider” under the other safe harbors. 
37 Id. § 512(a)(2). 
38 Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. 
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to selection of the specific infringing material—the allegedly 
infringing posts.  This construction ignores the legislative history and 
the plain meaning of the statutory text. 
¶13 “Selection of material” refers to “the editorial function of 
determining what material to send, or the specific sources of material 
to place on-line (e.g., a radio station), rather than ‘an automatic 
technical process’ of responding to a command or request, such as 
one from a user, an Internet location tool, or another network.”39  The 
district court’s construction of “selection” as referring to the specific 
infringing material ignores Congress’s intent that the term also refer 
to an ISP’s selection of sources of material.  According to a House 
Commerce Committee Report, selection of a source, such as selecting 
a particular radio station to broadcast, qualifies as “selection” under 
the safe harbor.40  In this case, AOL’s decision to host Usenet is 
analogous to a decision to broadcast radio stations, and AOL’s 
selection of certain newsgroups corresponds to selection of specific 
radio stations.  This is the kind of selection that disqualifies an ISP 
from limitation on liability under the Transitory Communications 
Safe Harbor. 
¶14 Furthermore, the statutory text makes no distinction between 
selection of infringing material and selection of non-infringing 
material.  The safe harbor applies to ISPs whose transmissions are 
“carried out through automatic technical process[es] without 
selection of the material by the service provider[s].”41  The proper 
distinction is between selection by automatic processes and selection 
by the ISPs.  The Ellison court read into the text an additional 
requirement not intended by Congress. 
C. Intermediate and Transient 
¶15 In order for an ISP to fall under the Transitory 
Communications Safe Harbor, and thereby avoid liability for its 
temporary storage of infringing material, such storage must be both 
“intermediate and transient.”42  AOL’s Usenet storage fails this test. 
¶16 The Ninth Circuit dispatched this “intermediate and transient” 
requirement in AOL’s favor by claiming that the safe harbor was 
                                                          
39 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 51 (emphasis added). 
40 Id. 
41 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(2). 
42 Id. § 512(a). 
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meant to codify the result of Religious Technology Center v. Netcom 
On-Line Communication Services.43  In Netcom, the court held that 
the Usenet operator in question was not liable for direct or vicarious 
copyright infringement for its automatic copying of infringing 
material posted by Usenet users.44  In that case, the Usenet operator 
maintained each post on its server for eleven days before deletion.45  
In Ellison, AOL maintained posts on its system for fourteen days.46  
The district court held that the three-day difference was insufficient to 
distinguish Ellison from Netcom,47 and the Ninth Circuit agreed.48 
¶17 The courts are correct that Netcom had a large influence over 
the development of the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor.  In 
fact, a House Judiciary Committee Report expressly states that this 
safe harbor “codifies the result of Netcom.”49  The Ninth Circuit, 
however, takes this statement out of context.  With respect to 
secondary liability, the “intermediate and transient” requirement of 
the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor codifies only a very 
specific element of Netcom’s holding.  As stated in the House 
Judiciary Committee Report: 
Netcom recognizes implicitly that intermediate copies may be retained 
without liability for only a limited period of time.  The requirement 
that “no copy [be] maintained on the system or network . . . for a 
longer period than reasonably necessary for the transmission” is drawn 
from the facts of the Netcom case, and is intended to codify this 
implicit limitation in the Netcom holding.50
                                                          
43 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Religious 
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995)). 
44 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1381. 
45 Id. at 1367. 
46 Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 357 F.3d at 1074 (9th Cir. 2004). 
47 Id. 
48 Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1081. 
49 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 24 (1998) (citations omitted). 
50 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4) (2000)) (alteration in original).  It should be 
noted that the Judiciary Committee Report refers to an earlier version of the 
legislation, which was not ultimately enacted as it existed at that time.  CoStar 
Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 554 (4th Cir. 2004).  However, the 
distinction between the earlier bill and the enacted statute is probably not 
relevant to issues of secondary infringement, see id. at 554-55, such as the issues 
involved in the case of Usenet operators. 
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¶18 The “intermediate and transient” requirement for safe harbor 
codifies Netcom only in that it allows ISPs to avoid liability for 
temporary storage during the transmission of material.  The safe 
harbor provision is silent as to exactly how long material may be 
stored for the purpose of transmission.  On this point, Netcom is 
merely a persuasive precedent and is not raised to the level of statute. 
¶19 The plain meaning of statutory text is the controlling factor in 
application of a statute.51  Plain meaning can be determined based on 
the common usage of included terms.  In common usage, “transient” 
is defined as “passing away with time; not permanent; temporary; 
transitory.”52  “Transitory” means “adapted for passing through.”53 
¶20 Even AOL admitted that it takes no more than a few hours to 
complete the peering process.54  During peering, material passes from 
AOL’s servers onto the servers of other ISPs.  Storage is not 
transitory after those first few hours.  After peering, AOL does 
nothing with its posts except allow them to sit undisturbed on its 
networks.  At that point, the material is no longer “passing through” 
AOL’s servers.  To the contrary, material remains on the networks 
only because of AOL’s policy to retain posts for a specified period of 
time. 
¶21 Admittedly, storage for eleven days, fourteen days, one 
hundred days, or even one million days qualifies as “passing away 
with time” and “not permanent,” arguably meeting the definition of 
transient.  However, this interpretation qualifies all ISPs that plan to 
eventually delete posts.  Because Congress provided for a separate 
safe harbor to limit liability for certain longer term storage, the 
Network Storage Safe Harbor, it is doubtful that Congress intended to 
include all possible storage durations under the Transitory 
Communications Safe Harbor. 
                                                          
51 United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (“There is, 
of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the 
words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.”); 
United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The primary 
indication of [congressional] intent is the language of the statute.”), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 515 US 593 (1995). 
52 WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1420 (3d Coll. ed. 1988). 
53 Id. at 1421. 
54 Answering Brief of Appellee America Online, Inc. at 45-46, Ellison v. 
Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-55797), 2002 WL 32303144. 
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¶22 The district court correctly pointed out that temporary storage 
of an email message in transit is the typical example of intermediate 
and transient storage.55  A House Commerce Committee Report 
voices its approval of an email service provider as the type of ISP 
protected by the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor.56  
“‘Intermediate and transient’ refers to such a copy made and/or stored 
in the course of a transmission, not a copy made or stored at the 
points where the transmission is initiated or received.”57  In other 
words, this particular safe harbor only limits liability with respect to 
certain temporary copies made for transmission.  An email message 
passes quickly through an ISP’s server from sender to recipient.  In 
contrast, a newsgroup post remains at an intermediate point—on an 
ISP’s server, ready to be downloaded by any user—for some pre-
specified period of time that is unrelated to the time it takes for the 
post to pass through the server.  While the fourteen-day storage is 
temporary, it is not transitory and, therefore, not transient. 
¶23 In this case, the plain meaning of the statute conflicts with the 
Netcom decision.  The Ellison courts should have looked to the 
meaning of the statute instead of relying solely on Netcom.58  A 
Usenet operator with a fourteen-day storage policy does not meet the 
intermediate and transient requirement and, therefore, does not 
qualify for the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor. 
D. Reasonably Necessary Retention Period & Anticipated Recipients 
¶24 An ISP does not qualify for the Transitory Communications 
Safe Harbor unless its stored material is made accessible to 
anticipated recipients for no longer than is reasonably necessary for 
transmission, routing, or provision of connections.59  Furthermore, 
posted material is not to be made accessible to unanticipated 
recipients for any period of time.60  AOL failed to meet these 
requirements. 
¶25 Once again, the Ellison courts relied on the facts of Netcom to 
decide that fourteen days was a reasonable retention period.  The 
                                                          
55 See Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in par on other grounds, 357 F.3d at 1074 (9th Cir. 2004). 
56 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 51 (1998). 
57 Id. at 50-51. 
58 See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). 
59 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4) (2000). 
60 Id. 
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Ninth Circuit’s only answer to the “reasonably necessary” 
requirement was that “Congress intended the relevant language of 
[this safe harbor] to codify the result of Netcom.”61  The courts 
misplaced their loyalties.  The language of the statute controls the 
issue;62 the facts of Netcom are merely persuasive and should not 
control when contradicting the plain language of the statute. 
¶26 The DMCA safe harbor statute gives no guidance as to what 
retention periods would qualify as reasonably necessary for 
transmission.  To determine an acceptable retention period, one 
should keep in mind the goal of retention.  AOL and other Usenet 
operators retain posts for two reasons: to transfer material to other 
ISPs’ servers, and to allow users to download posts.  For safe harbor, 
only anticipated users are allowed access to posts on an ISP’s Usenet 
server.63  Therefore, a qualifying ISP can retain material in a manner 
accessible to the public for no longer than is reasonably necessary for 
other servers and for anticipated users to retrieve such material. 
¶27 It takes only a few hours for AOL to transfer material to other 
servers,64 so fourteen days is longer than is reasonably necessary for 
the transmission of material to other ISPs.  However, the fourteen-day 
retention period may still be acceptable if it is reasonably necessary 
to deliver material to anticipated users.  Unfortunately for Usenet 
operators, this is not the case. 
¶28 Neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit considered the 
effect of the repeated term “anticipated recipients” in the safe harbor 
provision.  It is unlikely that Congress included this term without 
intent for it to have meaning.  “Anticipate” means “to look forward 
to; expect.”65  “Expect” is defined as “to look for as likely to occur or 
appear.”66  A qualifying ISP must ensure that material on its system 
is ordinarily accessible only to those recipients who are likely and 
expected to acquire such material.67  The entire public is unlikely to 
download any one post.  Furthermore, an interpretation of 
“anticipated” to refer to the entire public would eliminate the purpose 
of including the term in the statute at all.  It is unlikely that Congress 
                                                          
61 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004). 
62 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. at 543. 
63 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4). 
64 Answering Brief of Appellee America Online, Inc., supra note 54, at 45-46. 
65 WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, supra note 52, at 59. 
66 Id. at 478. 
67 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4). 
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meant the word to be ignored,68 so there must be specific anticipated 
recipients for each post. 
¶29 The previously mentioned House Commerce Committee 
Report presents two examples of temporary storage that qualify for 
this safe harbor: storage on a mail server while an email message is in 
transit, and storage of a web page in the course of transmission to a 
specific user.69  Both of these examples involve transmission to 
specific users, and these users are anticipated recipients.  In contrast 
with these examples, Usenet posts are not intended for specific users. 
¶30 Furthermore, the definition of “service provider” under this 
safe harbor supports the proposed construction that there must be 
specific intended recipients of stored material.  Recall that a service 
provider is an entity that “offer[s] the transmission, routing, or 
providing of connections for digital online communications, between 
or among points specified by a user.”70  If an ISP can only transmit 
material between or among specified points, such points correspond 
to anticipated recipients.  If “anticipated recipients” can be read to 
refer to the entire public, then necessarily, no user has specified 
points between or among which material is to be transmitted.  Such a 
broad interpretation would be contrary to the definition of “service 
provider.” 
¶31 The set of anticipated recipients can only be defined by the 
user posting material on a newsgroup.  Any likely and expected 
recipient has probably had some prior contact with the posting user 
over a newsgroup or elsewhere, or perhaps the set of likely and 
expected recipients includes all frequent users of a particular 
newsgroup.  Such recipients do not need fourteen days to find and 
download a newsgroup post.  Furthermore, posts containing only 
legal material are primarily composed of text, rather than encoded 
digital pirated works.  Text files can be downloaded in seconds over 
today’s internet connections.  If the purpose of a newsgroup is 
discussion and swapping of legal files, fourteen days is more than is 
reasonably necessary to accomplish this task.  Swapping files with 
anticipated recipients need not take more than a few days. 
                                                          
68 See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (“In construing a 
statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.”). 
69 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 51 (1998). 
70 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A). 
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¶32 If there are anticipated recipients, then others are 
unanticipated.  Where Usenet is available, it is generally open to the 
public.71  Consequently, even users unlikely and unexpected to 
receive a particular post have access to that post.  To qualify for the 
Transitory Communications Safe Harbor, an ISP must ensure that 
material is not available to unanticipated recipients.72  While material 
is retained by a Usenet operator, all users have access—including 
unanticipated users. 
¶33 AOL and other Usenet operators make material accessible to 
anticipated users for longer than is reasonably necessary.  
Furthermore, they fail to ensure that material is inaccessible to 
unanticipated users.  Therefore, Usenet operators do not meet the 
requirements for the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor. 
II. FAILURE TO CONSIDER OTHER SAFE HARBORS 
¶34 In Ellison, neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit 
considered the application of any safe harbor other than the 
Transitory Communications Safe Harbor.  In fact, the district court 
assumed that it was unnecessary to consider the Network Storage 
Safe Harbor after finding that the Transitory Communications Safe 
Harbor applied.73  The Ninth Circuit failed to correct this 
assumption,74 which was based on a misinterpretation of the safe 
harbor provisions. 
¶35 Although the district court did not explain the basis for its 
decision not to consider the Network Storage Safe Harbor, logically, 
there are two possible reasons for this choice:  Either the district court 
assumed that the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor provides 
blanket immunity for copyright infringement, or the district court felt 
that the limitation on liability covered all of AOL’s actions in this 
particular instance.  In either case, the district court’s reasoning 
would be incorrect. 
                                                          
71 Desmond, supra note 2, at 27. 
72 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4). 
73 Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1072 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 357 F.3d at 1074 (9th Cir. 2004). 
74 See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1081 n.12 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining 
to consider the application of the Network Storage Safe Harbor on the grounds 
that other matters had yet to be decided). 
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A. No Blanket Immunity 
¶36 The DMCA provides four separate safe harbors, and 
qualification under one safe harbor has no impact on potential 
qualification under another.75  An ISP may need to qualify for 
multiple safe harbors to be completely shielded from monetary 
liability.  A Senate Judiciary Committee Report provides a useful 
example of this principle:  Consider an ISP that provides a hyperlink 
to a site containing infringing material.  The ISP caches the infringing 
material on its system to facilitate access by its users.  Now suppose a 
party claims infringement for both the ISP’s system caching and its 
use of location tools.  If the ISP wishes to be shielded from monetary 
liability, it needs the protections of both the System Caching Safe 
Harbor76 and the Information Location Tools Safe Harbor.77 
¶37 If the district court’s refusal to consider the Network Storage 
Safe Harbor was based on a belief that the Transitory 
Communications Safe Harbor provides blanket immunity, then the 
court misunderstood the structure of the safe harbor provisions.  Such 
a belief ignores the statutory language as well as the legislative 
history. 
B. Transitory Communications Safe Harbor is Insufficient in This 
Case 
¶38 While the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor may 
protect a Usenet operator from copyright infringement for its 
transferring material to and from other ISPs’ servers, it does not 
protect the operator from continued storage for more than a few 
days.78  Where a Usenet operator retains material for fourteen days, 
the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor is not enough to shield 
the ISP from all monetary liability.  Other safe harbors should be 
considered. 
III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SAFE HARBORS 
¶39 Aside from limiting liability for different categories of ISP 
conduct, the effects of Transitory Communications Safe Harbor and 
the Network Storage Safe Harbor, which the Ellison courts failed to 
                                                          
75 17 U.S.C. § 512(n). 
76 Id. § 512(b). 
77 Id. § 512(d); S. REP. 105-190, at 55-56 (1998). 
78 See discussion supra Part I.D. 
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consider, differ in two significant respects:  The Network Storage 
Safe Harbor includes provisions for “notice and take-down” 
procedures79 and for subpoena issuance.80  Whether the Network 
Storage Safe Harbor applies to Usenet operators is beyond the scope 
of this iBrief.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Transitory 
Communications Safe Harbor is more lenient on qualifying ISPs in 
that it does not have the notice and take-down procedures and 
subpoena provisions. 
¶40 To maintain qualification for the Network Storage Safe 
Harbor, an ISP must comply with notice and take-down procedures 
by which it expeditiously removes, or disables access to, allegedly 
infringing material.81  The notice and take-down procedures were 
instituted to create a cooperative process by which copyright holders 
and ISPs could work to minimize the amount of infringing material 
on ISPs’ systems.82  The notice and take-down procedures require  an 
ISP to remove allegedly infringing material when the ISP has been 
formally notified of the existence of such material.83  Such material 
must be replaced if the ISP receives formal counter-notification from 
the allegedly infringing user, unless the copyright holder notifies the 
ISP that he intends to litigate the infringement issue.84 
¶41 The subpoena provisions allow a party to compel an ISP to 
disclose the names of subscribers whom such party believes are 
infringing its copyrights.85  Subpoenas can be issued to ISPs that 
qualify under the Network Storage Safe Harbor but cannot be issued 
to ISPs for activity that qualifies for safe harbor under the Transitory 
Communications Safe Harbor.86  For a subpoena to issue, the 
copyright holder must specify the infringing material to be removed 
or to which access is to be disabled.87  In theory, ISPs that qualify 
only under the latter safe harbor are mere conduits for transferring 
data.88  Such ISPs “can neither ‘remove’ nor ‘disable access to’ the 
                                                          
79 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2). 
80 Id. § 512(h). 
81 Id. § 512(g)(2). 
82 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 54 (1998). 
83 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
84 Id. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
85 Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229, 
1232 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)). 
86 Id. at 1233. 
87 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(4), (c)(3)(A)(iii). 
88 Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 351 F.3d at 1237. 
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infringing material because that material is not stored on the ISP’s 
servers.”89  Given this, no subpoena may issue to compel an ISP to 
reveal of identities of infringing users, where such ISP’s allegedly 
infringing activity falls under the Transitory Communications Safe 
Harbor.90 
¶42 The fact that the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor has 
no notice and take-down procedures and no subpoena provisions has 
tremendous implications for Usenet operators.  If a court finds that 
Usenet operators qualify for the Transitory Communications Safe 
Harbor, these operators will not be required to remove infringing 
material, and no subpoena may issue to the operators requiring 
disclosure of subscriber names.  In short, it becomes more difficult, if 
not impossible, to compel Usenet operators to assist in eliminating 
infringing material from their systems, when courts deem those 
operators’ activities to fall under the Transitory Communications Safe 
Harbor. 
CONCLUSION 
¶43 In finding that Usenet-operator AOL might be shielded from 
liability for secondary copyright infringement, the Ellison courts 
ignored the tremendous potential for copyright infringement in 
newsgroups.  Ellison misinterpreted the Transitory Communications 
Safe Harbor to provide blanket immunity for copyright infringement.  
The courts also disregarded the potential application of the Network 
Storage Safe Harbor, which might have limited AOL’s liability.  
Furthermore, if the courts had found that the Network Storage Safe 
Harbor, as opposed to the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor, 
applied to AOL, copyright holders would have means to protect their 
copyrighted works by way of the notice and take-down procedures 
and the subpoena provisions. 
¶44 Perhaps courts are concerned that requiring strict standards for 
qualification under the safe harbors will put too much pressure on 
ISPs.  ISPs like AOL play an indispensable role in providing internet 
access to the masses.  However, courts need not be so concerned that 
they limit liability without thorough analysis.  The safe harbors 
provide an extra line of defense for ISPs.  Even when an ISP fails to 
qualify for safe harbor, it may still be able to avoid liability for 
                                                          
89 Id. at 1235. 
90 Id. at 1236. 
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copyright infringement.  The safe harbors do not replace the 
traditional analyses of direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright 
infringement.91  Failure to qualify for safe harbor simply means that 
an ISP will have to litigate the traditional infringement issues.92  
Liability is not implied simply because an ISP does not fall under a 
safe harbor. 
¶45 If courts truly wish to alleviate the problem of piracy on the 
internet, they need to interpret copyright law more strictly.  ISPs need 
to be aware of the potential for illegal conduct on their networks.  A 
strict interpretation of copyright protection laws will not put ISPs out 
of business.  Finding ISPs liable for secondary copyright 
infringement encourages ISPs to offer services that have a lesser 
potential for distributing illegal material.  In contrast, shielding 
secondary infringers only allows pirates the means to illegally 
reproduce and distribute copyrighted works. 
                                                          
91 Perfect 10 v. Cybernet Ventures, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50 (1998)). 
92 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50. 
